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Abstract 
Small States in World Markets is about political efficacy and legitimation rather than 
scoring who is ahead in the economic sweepstakes. Its case for democratic corporatism 
rests on norms, particularly stability, rather than on narrow measures of economic 
efficiency. But stability and the efficacious management of the economy and social 
problems requires a degree of technocracy that undermines the legitimacy of the 
management process itself by helping to produce populist revolts. 
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Small States in World Markets, and its older sibling, Corporatism and Change, are now 
25 and 26 years old. Both were immediate successes, as Small States attracted the 
Woodrow Wilson Foundation Prize and launched Peter Katzenstein from the low earth 
orbit he had already attained from editing Between Power and Plenty into the permanent 
geo-synchronous orbit occupied by only a few of the American political science elite. 
What made Small States (SSWM hereafter) such a success? Does SSWM hold up in the 
harsh light that illuminates hindsight? Given limited space I will answer the first question 
by looking at the relationship of SSWM to the broader comparative capitalism literature. 
This leads to the second issue of whether SSWM holds up, which I consider by looking at 
how immigration by non-Europeans and non-Christians has affected the ideology of 
social partnership and the practical political efficacy at the heart of SSWM’s argument. 
To put the main point briefly, SSWM is more a book about political efficacy and 
legitimation than it is a book about scoring who is ahead in the economic sweepstakes. It 
rests its case for democratic corporatism on norms, particularly stability as an end in 
itself, rather than on the production of a higher ranking in the comparative capitalism 
league table. The long run problem, however, is that stability and the efficacious 
management of the economy and social problems requires a degree of technocracy that 
undermines the legitimacy of the management process itself by helping to produce 
populist revolts. 
 
From Modern Capitalism to Small States, from Small States to Varieties of Capitalism 
SSWM was a remarkable success. Google Scholar credits it with roughly 2200 citations, 
which puts it in the same league as the much later Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) or 
Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics, both of whose currency amplifies their 
counts. SSWM reoriented an entire generation of American scholarship on Europe away 
from the four large Western European countries and towards Europe’s interstices. But in 
one way, SSWM represented the end of an arc of scholarship on comparative capitalism 
that started with Andrew Shonfield’s (1965) Modern Capitalism. In another, SSWM 
represented the apogee of that arc, if we locate VOC as an end point.  
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Shonfield revived the institutional economics pioneered by Thorstein Veblen in 
the early 1900s and formalized by Frank Knight and John Commons in the 1930s – a 
great achievement. Mainstream economists largely looked at the micro-economic 
behaviour of firms acting in isolation. Shonfield largely focussed on the relationships 
among states, organized firms and unions. The Depression and World War 2 had 
decisively shifted these relationships away from laissez faire and towards various 
flavours of cooperation and state direction of the economy. In particular, Shonfield 
argued, states had become heavily involved in the process of wage formation, on the one 
side, and the quality and quantity of investment needed to validate those wages on the 
other side. Intervention stabilized those economies macro-economically, and facilitated a 
massive micro-economic shift away from traditional agriculture and towards 
manufacturing and industrial agriculture. Intervention stabilized politics too. Rising real 
wages, full employment, and stable returns on capital moved politics away from the 
extremes of the 1920s and 1930s.  
Shonfield saw the political contradictions his modern capitalism contained. 
States’ control over investment and intervention in wage formation enabled them to 
reduce what economic debates of the 1930s called the socialist calculation problem. As 
Hayek had pointed out, ‘if detailed economic plans could be laid down for fairly long 
periods in advance and then closely adhered to, so that no further economic decisions of 
importance would be required, the task of drawing up a comprehensive plan governing all 
economic activity would be much less formidable… Economic problems arise always 
and only in consequence of change’ (Hayek, 1984: 215). Hayek understood the market as 
an information aggregating and processing machine that reacted to changes more quickly 
than any bureaucracy. Could states really replace this machine and plan? Shonfield’s 
states diminished the information problems in two ways that matter here.  
First, post-war states in effect ‘created information’ through state directed 
investment programs and through their participation in collective bargaining. As 
Eichengreen (2008) argues, state investment programs gave market actors advance 
information about market opportunities and the size and stability of demand. State 
participation in collective bargaining reduced uncertainty, thus setting limits on outcomes 
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and assuring that bargains would largely stick. At the same time, centralized business 
organizations and union federations gave states access to private information that 
otherwise might remain hidden in the economy, while binding actors’ behaviour.  
Second, as Hayek notes, ‘problems arise only in consequence of change.’ States’ 
pursuit of stability through a levelling of wages and a homogenization of consumption 
reduced volatility in the quantity and quality of demand. States – except for the United 
States – could plan because they were chasing a known model: the fordist, mass 
production, mass consumption, assembly-line based mechanical technologies first rolled 
out in the United States (Aglietta, 1979; de Grazie, 2005). So information was in effect 
already known to states and to the organized business and labour supporting these states 
politically.  
Each of these economic management features contained a dark side that gave 
Shonfield’s analysis an owl of minervish tinge. Modern Capitalism was published in 
1965, on the eve of a decade of intense strife between management and labour, 
particularly in automobile production, the archetypical fordist industry. Modern 
Capitalism indeed anticipated this strife in its discussions of the breakdown of 
cooperative collective bargaining in the Netherlands in 1963. Disputes over fair shares, 
the monotony of work, and the homogenization of the labour force animated this strife. 
Shonfield also took particular pains in Modern Capitalism to consider the consequences 
of concentrating so much power into so few hands. The two final chapters of Modern 
Capitalism deal with the decreasing public accountability of insulated managers, 
bureaucracies and economic interest organizations. Shonfield correctly understood and 
predicted the delegitimizing consequences of this insulation. The late 1960s and 1970s 
saw explicit challenges from both left and right to centralization, bureaucratic control, 
and the standardization and routinization of life under fordism. States’ and organized 
interests’ management of some economic information displaced other economic 
information – for example about the social and environmental costs of mass production – 
into new political and cultural conflicts. 
SSWM can be read as – and in some sense was sold as – a treatise on proper 
economic management, just like the bulk of Shonfield’s Modern Capitalism. SSWM 
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noted that big countries were becoming more like small countries in terms of their 
vulnerability to global markets and to the turbulence in those markets in the 1970s. This 
turbulence directly threatened the economic stability of the 1950s and 1960s. SSWM 
offered up the small states as models for dealing with the turbulence that Katzenstein 
apparently viewed as a novel but irreversible feature of the global economy. But SSWM 
did not offer the small states up as models for economic growth, even though it notes in 
passing that the average American often had a lower standard of living than the average 
smallster. SSWM makes very careful and limited claims about both the transferability 
and economic efficacy of the small state model for larger states. Indeed, Katzenstein 
takes pains to avoid both the fallacy of composition – not all economies can be above 
average – and the notion that economic efficiency is the primary goal. 
Rather, SSWM’s major concerns and claims cover the issue raised in Shonfield’s 
last two chapters: can actors maintain political legitimacy given the new economic 
realities. Katzenstein (1985: 29) defined his yardstick for success as ‘the extent to which 
social coalitions, political institutions, and public policies facilitate or impede shifts in the 
factors of production that increase economic efficiency with due regard to the 
requirements of political legitimacy.’ SSWM can thus be seen as a meditation on 
Shonfield’s concerns about legitimacy. 
This is why SSWM can be seen as the apogee of the project Shonfield started. 
Just as Shonfield’s analysis harkens back to the deleterious economic consequences of 
the Great Depression, Katzenstein’s harkens back to the Depression’s deleterious 
political consequences. Shonfield feared that the institutional arrangements needed to 
stabilize modern capitalism would diminish individual rights and freedoms. I think that 
Katzenstein feared that the failure to manage the new turbulence would bring about the 
same kind of political instability that savagely extinguished individuals and individual 
rights in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus SSWM is profoundly conservative despite its evident 
admiration for European social democracies. At heart, SSWM expressed a yearning to 
preserve for as long as possible the cooperation and solidarity that underpinned the post-
war compromise. Katzenstein, recall, defined democratic corporatism largely in terms of 
processes and ideologies reflecting cooperation and sharing:  an ideology of social 
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partnership and voluntary and continuous bargaining over conflicting interests conducted 
through (Shonfield’s) centralized system of organized interests.  
Yet the last of these three defining features is, as Weber would put it, ethically 
neutral. Even if we limit ‘a centralized system of interest groups’ to corporatist polities, 
this does not guarantee cooperative bargaining and shared sacrifice. States in 
Manoïlescu’s Romania, Mussolini’s Italy and Vargas’ Brazil all centralized and 
organized economic interest groups for purposes different from Katzenstein’s social and 
liberal corporatist states. A centralized system of organized interests is simply a machine. 
The important issue is the shared sense of social purpose animating that machine. (And 
much of Katzenstein’s later work focussed precisely on the social construction of 
interests and political identity.) SSWM is not ethically neutral. The ghost in SSWM’s 
state machines is the lingering political lesson of the depression:  cooperation and 
compensation were better than conflict and catastrophe. The archetypical policy this spirit 
and machine produced is thus incomes policy designed to provide domestic 
compensation for those battered by global gales (Katzenstein, 1985: 49).  
Shonfield saw the cost of shifting away from the economic message of pre-war 
classical liberalism. Unconstrained markets were flexible, but neither durable nor stable. 
The market needed the state in order to avoid self-destruction, even if this came at the 
price of some individual liberty. Katzenstein inverted the pre-war classical liberalism 
lingering in Shonfield’s politics. An individualistic polity and winner-take-all politics 
were also neither stable nor durable. Individuals needed to be corralled into organizations 
and to accept some limits on economic gain in order to avoid a destructive politics 
triggered by economic changes. Individuals needed the state and disciplined interest 
organizations to avoid the total loss of liberty characteristic of the 1930s. And 
Katzenstein, recall, wrote SSWM when state evisceration of unions was just gaining 
speed in the Anglo-countries, and when finance was displacing manufacturing as the 
politically dominant fraction of those business communities. Elsewhere, collective 
bargaining was decentralizing, with what were then unknown consequences for 
continuous bargaining over conflicting interests. 
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SSWM’s deep argument about the attractiveness of the democratic corporatist 
model thus rests on norms rather than narrow economic success. Seeking good enough 
returns with a placid politics was better than doing better via tumult. This turned out to be 
a good strategic choice. Cracks were already visible in the small states’ economic 
foundations when Katzenstein was writing. SSWM mentions the apt and widely 
attributed snark about Denmark being on a fast train to hell, albeit at least travelling first 
class. But at that time the Netherlands was also projected to soon have its entire 
workforce on disability pensions, Belgian public debt had pierced the 100 per cent of 
GDP level, and a series of bourgeois coalition governments in Sweden had embarked on 
a costly and disastrous nationalization spree. The 1990s saw substantial shifts in 
economic and social policy, though not always in the principle of compensation, as the 
seven dwarfs sought to dig themselves out of the hole they fell into in the 1980s (Jones, 
2008). Meanwhile, though not all of the big economies prospered in the 1990s, the 
disorderly, disorganized and conflictual American economy did substantially better than 
its organized competitors. Still, small state cooperation, coordination and compensation 
delayed the income inequality and consequent criminal and social pathologies emerging 
everywhere in the OECD. Economic outcomes thus don’t provide a handy way to assess 
the durability of SSWM’s argument. This was neither Katzenstein’s criterion nor his 
main point. The real question then, if we want to assess SSWM with the benefit of 
hindsight, is the durability of democratic corporatism as a politically efficacious system 
for maintaining the legitimacy of a given and benign system of political and social power. 
Before doing that I want to anchor SSWM against the other benchmark I 
suggested above:  Varieties of Capitalism (VOC). Like SSWM and Modern Capitalism, 
VOC is a product of its time. Where Modern Capitalism sought to explain placid macro-
economic waters and SSWM dealt with navigating an unexpected run of rapids, VOC 
reflects the triumph of business and of micro-economic models at century’s end. Micro-
economic behaviours create and sustain VOC’s institutional complementarities, even if it 
takes negotiation to arrive at decisions in coordinated economies. While negotiation 
matters, it is all about the adjustment of economic interests, particularly in 
manufacturing, and not about a particular conception of justice.  
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Like SSWM, VOC is cautious about idealizing one specific politico-economic 
model, essentially arguing: different models for different kinds of assets. Yet VOC 
equally avoids any consideration of the normative issues that animated Modern 
Capitalism and SSWM. VOC thus radically narrows the scope of inquiry in both Modern 
Capitalism and SSWM. SSWM reoriented Modern Capitalism away from a predominant 
focus on ‘who is getting more aggregate economic and employment growth’ towards a 
focus on political efficacy, towards ‘who is best able to keep all parties bought into a 
stable social compromise.’ VOC, by contrast, worries mostly about institutional 
complementarities rather than final ends, and micro-economic issues in manufacturing 
rather than macro-economic stability. VOC explains businesses’ attachment to some 
social programs through micro-economic rationality, rather than an attachment to 
cooperation as a process that yields legitimacy to outcomes that might require short run 
sacrifices. Like Modern Capitalism and SSWM in their time, VOC has a similar owl of 
minerva feel to it. Manufacturing still matters, but the bulk of consumer demand is 
gradually shifting away from manufactured goods narrowly and towards both services 
and goods with high levels of embodied information. In this sense, VOC provides a 
radically narrower vision than either Modern Capitalism or SSWM, which at least 
exposed the bones of the prior set of compromises. 
VOC’s silence on norms is even louder when we consider the bifurcation of the 
seven dwarves since the 1980s. Even as SSWM was published, the notion of a distinct 
Nordic model was emerging. Unlike the low country and Alpine dwarves, these societies 
saw increases in union density – surely a precondition for and confirmation of successful 
collective bargaining – from the 1970s onward. And if Rothstein (2001) is correct, a 
central part of the success and distinctiveness of the Nordic model is a high level of social 
capital, or legitimacy, that sustains social compromises. By contrast, Belgium and 
Netherlands saw increasing political disunity (Jones, 2008). VOC has thus round-tripped 
to Modern Capitalism’s practical concerns for economic management while losing its 
moral concerns. 
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The unbearable darkness of immigrants 
With that in mind, does SSWM still shed light on the path forward? An ideology of social 
partnership and consensus building lies at the heart of SSWM’s argument about political 
accommodation both as an end in itself and also as a means towards economic 
adaptability. Yet it is hard to see that ideology persisting going forward. Katzenstein 
stressed that smallness itself matters – elites in small countries can gather around a dinner 
table to hammer out incremental, reactive and flexible responses to changes in their 
environment. But size itself is not sufficient, or New Zealand, Ireland and Finland might 
qualify for the democratic corporatism label. Indeed, some political elites in 1980s New 
Zealand sought and failed to recast New Zealand’s political and collective bargaining 
institutions in a corporatist direction (Castles et al., 1996). In the 1990s, Ireland similarly 
fashioned something like a corporatist social pact, which some analysts credit for at least 
part of the Irish miracle (Daly, 2005, disagrees).  
Social partnership in the seven dwarves reflected three factors that are all 
decaying. Katzenstein focussed on the shared experience of the 1930s – already now 
three generations past and thus barely a lived experience for one of those generations. He 
had less to say about the relative immobility of capital, although relative mobility was at 
the heart of the distinction between social and liberal corporatism. Increased capital 
mobility has decreased trust between capital and labour and undermined the conditions 
for successful corporatism (Schwartz, 1998). But the most important political factor is 
that the incredibly ethnically homogenous populations created or existing in the 1920s 
and 1930s have disappeared. Homogeneity made cooperation easier, and prevented the 
exclusion of economic losers. 
Where Katzenstein’s America had to cope with the increasing globalization in the 
form of rising import penetration and competition for local industry, globalization has 
challenged the small states via rising immigration. Rising immigration has transformed 
these once homogenous societies into something closer to fractious and factionalized 
America. Immigrants now account for double digit percentages of the population in most 
of the seven dwarves. Switzerland has always had a large immigrant population, but 
mostly from its neighbours and Portugal. Immigrant populations in Sweden, Austria and 
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Belgium now rival or exceed the 12.5 percent level currently found in the United States. 
Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands remain below or at the 10 per cent level (OECD 
2007: 328). Yet even in these last three countries, immigrants have been a politically 
contentious, consensus threatening issue the past decade or two. 
Put aside spectacles like Theo van Gogh’s murder or the Danish Mohammed 
cartoon controversy. What makes immigrants problematic for the democratic corporatist 
model is that their presence has prompted the emergence of uncoalitionable anti-
immigrant parties, and that immigrants have no easy path (or desire?) to assimilate. The 
uncoalitionable Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) is the second largest and 
most dynamic party in Norway, capable of capturing a quarter of seats in Parliament. The 
Danish Peoples Party (Dansk Folkeparti) similarly is now the third largest party, and the 
second largest workers’ party. Though uncoalitionable, its indispensible if tacit support 
for minority right-of-centre governments bought it significant restrictions on 
immigration. And so on down the line with the Belgian Vlaams Belang, the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) and the Dutch Party for Freedom 
(Partij voor de Frijheit). Only Sweden’s Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) had yet to 
break through the threshold for parliamentary representation as of early 2010, though it 
was surprisingly successful in the 2006 local elections. The anti-immigrant parties signal 
the erosion of the social consensus behind democratic corporatism. Inclusion and the 
discipline of the organized cannot be taken for granted, as explicit populist welfare 
chauvinism (Mudde, 2007) means the welfare state cannot be used to promote economic 
flexibility.  
Meanwhile the newer, darker immigrants are not partners anywhere. It was easy 
enough for people who thought first of themselves as citizens and perhaps only 
secondarily as taxpayers to be solidaristic when the losers from economic transformation 
were one’s rural relatives, or a late middle age uncle made redundant by new technology, 
or the poorly educated parents who launched one’s own ascent into middle class stability. 
Their spells of unemployment or ill-health were ‘naturally’ understandable and politically 
acceptable. By contrast, darker, non-Christian immigrants remain behaviourally opaque 
to the larger community. This opacity prevents an understanding of the usual life events 
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that might reduce labour market participation in societies in which labour force 
participation remains an irreducible component of the moral claim on state and thus 
social resources. Labour force participation for small state immigrants (even in 
Switzerland) is uniformly lower than for the native population. Indeed, male immigrants 
participate at rates lower than native women in Scandinavia (see Table 1) (OECD, 2007). 
This contrasts with the larger economies, where immigrant labour force participation 
rates approximate or sometimes exceed natives’ participation rates (OECD, 2007). 
Distrust and thus separation ensues. 
 
Table 1: Labour Force Participation rates in 2005, percent 
  AT  BE  DK  NLD  NO  SE  SZ  
Male native  75 67 81 82 77 76 85 
Male immigrant  68 61 69 69 67 64 81 
difference -7 -6 -12 -13 -10 -12 -4 
Female  native  63 57 73 69 72 73 73 
Female immigrant  56 39 53 53 60 58 63 
difference -7 -18 -20 -16 -12 -15 -10 
immigrant Male net 
            native Female 
5 4 -4 0 -5 -9 8 
Source: OECD, Migration Trends, 2007 
 
Moreover, as Unni Wikan (2002) has argued, immigrants find themselves bereft 
of the possibility for integration into the larger social compromise or consensus that 
underpins democratic corporatism. State policy has essentialised immigrant cultures, 
locking immigrants out of assimilation. Citizenship appears to be an empty legal 
formality that carries with it no further obligations, including work. Immigrants, 
meanwhile, cluster in tight communities with denser connections to their place of origin 
than to the local society, locking themselves into a condition of difference. So immigrants 
remain sojourners excluded from the machinery of compromise behind SSWM’s 
democratic corporatism. Sadly, where an ideology that accommodates immigrants exists, 
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as in the United States, Canada or Australia, there is little consensus about a social 
partnership. Where a consensus on social partnership exists, as in the smalls, there is little 
ideological basis for accommodating (darker) immigrants. And immigrants find exclusion 
even in death. In Denmark, Muslims lack a cemetery of their own (Klausen, 2005). 
The fights around immigration and immigrants reveal the slow erosion of 
ideology of social partnership and consensus building. But this is not to blame the 
immigrants for their mere presence. Rather, the fights around immigration reveal 
precisely the problems with elite economic management already signalled in Modern 
Capitalism. The disenchantment with technocratic politics, conformity, and control that 
motivated the great factory riots of the 1960s in Shonfield’s big economies play out now 
as cultural riots in the seven dwarves. Elites in the seven dwarves have managed 
immigrant (non-)assimilation the same way they managed welfare state transformation in 
response to the shocks of the 1980s.  
The Dutch, for example, fixed their employment problem through the famous 
1982 Wassenaar Accord, in which the state induced wage moderation from unions in 
exchange for promises of investment from business (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; for a 
critique, Salverda 2005). Wassenaar’s deal on wages and welfare state reform, though not 
mentioned in SSWM, is surely precisely what Katzenstein was thinking of when he 
constructed SSWM. Yet Wassenaar and its cognates in the other six countries led to a 
politics of disenchantment with elite driven deals. Wim Kok, the Netherlands’ prime 
minister through much of the 1990s and an architect of Wassenaar and other technocratic 
adjustments to the Dutch welfare state, went on to a fabulous career in the EU after 
dismissing the Pim Fortuyn phenomenon as media hype. But he fled a disgruntled 
electorate that brutally punished his Labour Party in the 2002 election subsequent to his 
resignation. The same electorate also rejected a similar politics of elite driven 
‘Europeanization’ in the 2006 referendum on the European constitution. Dutch dikes 
don’t wall off this kind of politics from the rest of Europe. All the small state anti-
immigrant parties are populist parties channelling resentment against the elite 
management of the economy and society that is isomorphic with democratic corporatism. 
And they are uniformly euro-sceptical. Democratic corporatism (and European 
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integration) might indeed be good in some objective sense for the disgruntled – indeed 
there is evidence that populist voters shift to traditional parties as unemployment rises 
(Bjørklund, 2007) – but no one has asked them if this is so. Shonfield’s concerns about 
technocratic management of the state and the firm remain live issues today. 
 
Conclusions   
SSWM is a moral tract wrapped in a comparative capitalism kimono. It argues that a 
specific form of political rigidity can produce economic flexibility, and by thus allowing 
adjustment with legitimacy, also preserve political stability. SSWM thus provided one 
answer to the question Shonfield raised at the end of Modern Capitalism: can the 
technocratic management that the modern economy and firm make necessary 
accommodate the preservation of individual rights and individual deviance? Katzenstein 
argued that political legitimacy and consensus permitted better, in the sense of flexible, 
economic management, and that in turn, this flexibility helped maintain political 
legitimacy. However the social basis for legitimate management of the economy has 
decayed since the 1980s. The social cohesion created by homogenous populations and a 
shared, if later vicarious, experience of the Depression and Second World War is a 
currency now spent. Marketization everywhere has given primacy to the economic 
flexibility tail rather than the political legitimacy dog, making it unlikely that elites will 
replenish the social capital spent on flexibility and Europeanization in the 1980s and 
1990s. Political economy’s current obsession with micro-economic models sheds little 
light on why that particular account needs an injection of new funds. Even if SSWM’s 
answer to Shonfield’s question failed to foresee the emergence of non-European 
immigration, Europeanization, and marketization, its logical structure provides a good 
guide for understanding the possible consequences of those phenomena. Populism in the 
1920s and 1930s turned into a brutal politics as the Depression wore on. The current 
global financial crisis may make Katzenstein’s message about stability important again. 
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